This study surveys the characteristics of the corridors being considered by state and regional agencies for high-speed rail service in the United States. Using a data set of 21 systems at various stages of development, the study shows that the initiatives underway involve 64 corridors, the tracks of 21 freight railroads, and 15,552 unique miles of route.
INTRODUCTION
any state and regional governments are actively promoting the development of high-speed rail systems in response to growing concerns about traffic congestion, the sustainability of development, and constraints on airport capacity. These systems are envisioned as investments to facilitate economic development, improve mobility, and reduce the country's dependence on oil.
This study surveys the expanse of the high-speed rail movement and notable assumptions that underlie the development of a national system, particularly with respect to the rights of way being proposed. The study explores the degree to which the rights of way identified for highspeed service are publicly owned, equipped with multiple tracks, and are currently used by various types of traffic (e.g., mainline freight traffic, commuter, and Amtrak service) as well as other relevant issues.
The study is based on a data set of the routes identified for operations at speeds of 110 mph or higher, including those routes that have not advanced to the point that they are eligible for U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) designation as Federal High-Speed Rail corridors. The findings from the study will help fill a gap in the literature about the differing circumstances that face agencies seeking to establish high-speed service in various corridors. Although many studies have examined the general state of the high-speed rail (HSR) movement and have focused on particular corridors, little has been written about the overall qualities of the corridors in the aggregate.
BACKGROUND
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) defines High-Speed Ground Transportation (HSGT) as "intercity passenger ground transportation-by steel-wheel railroad or magnetic levitation (Maglev)-that is time-competitive with air and/or auto for travel markets in the approximate range of 100-500 miles" (1) . As this definition suggests, agencies in the United States tend to use the term "high-speed rail" more loosely than their counterparts in Europe and Asia, who often limit its use to corridors in which trains operates at 200 kilometers per hour (about 125 mph) or more. The High Speed Ground Transportation Association often uses the term "intermediate speed" to describe HSR services at speeds of less than 150 mph.
Efforts to create high-speed intercity rail systems in the United States date back many years. In the 1950s and 1960s, railroad companies experimented with new technologies capable of relatively high-speed operation (2) . In 1965, Congress passed the High Speed Ground Transportation Act, which with its budget of $90 million started a federal effort to develop and demonstrate the potential of high-speed rail (HSR). The introduction of the Metroliner in 1969 between New York and Washington, D.C., marked the beginning of regularly scheduled service at speeds of 110 mph or more on American soil. The federal effort included comprehensive M planning focusing on the "megalopolis" emerging between Boston and Washington, D.C., called the Northeast Corridor, as well as research and programs devoted to Maglev and other advanced transportation technologies (1).
Amtrak was created in 1971 to relieve the freight railroads of the burden of operating intercity passenger rail service and to ensure the continued existence of a national rail passenger network. Subsequently, efforts to promote HSR in the 1970s focused predominately on rehabilitating the Northeast Corridor (2, 1). In the 1980s, however, federal efforts shifted to other potential HSR opportunities, with the Passenger Railroad Rebuilding Act of 1980 providing funding for state-sponsored design and engineering studies. The involvement of state governments in HSR programs gradually grew, and by 1986 several states had awarded contracts to private developers to build and operate intercity HSR systems. However, all of these efforts eventually stalled for reasons such as funding issues, political will, and uncertainty of success.
The passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991 and the creation of the Next Generation High-Speed Rail Technology Development Program in 1994 made possible the further evaluation of HSR systems. In 1997, the FRA completed a major study that explored opportunities for corridor development and began the practice of officially designating HSR corridors (1) . The agency has thus far granted this designation to about 12,000 miles of routes, rendering them candidates for federal funds.
The HSR movement crossed a milestone in 2001 when Amtrak launched Acela Express service from New York to both Boston and Washington, D.C. For the first time, regularly scheduled trains in the country traveled at speeds equal to or greater than 135 mph. From endpoint to endpoint, however, average speeds on Acela routes remain well below 80 mph, making the service considerably slower than comparable routes in many European countries and Japan.
For most of the country, HSR remains more a dream than reality. Although several corridors have received federal funds for grade-crossing improvements, major federal investment in HSR service outside the Northeast has been slow to materialize.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the research relevant to HSR in the United States can be assigned to one of three categories: (i) the exploration of either the economic benefits or economic feasibility of highspeed service in a single corridor or group of corridors; (ii) the evaluation of technical and economic issues associated with the development of a national high-speed network; and (iii) opportunities for HSR development based on international experiences.
Studies in the first category, economic benefits or feasibility of particular HSR corridors, tend to be generated by private consulting companies or universities at the request of government agencies. At least of dozen major studies of proposed corridors have been undertaken over the past several years. Several studies, including works by Levinson, Kanafani, and Gillen (3, 4) , compare the full social cost of various transportation modes in various corridors, attempting to determine whether investments in high-speed ground transportation are less costly than expansions to air and rail systems.
In the second category, technical and economic issues associated with the creation of a national HSR network, most of the studies draw attention to the barriers in the development highspeed rail systems. For example, a 1999 General Accountability Office study, "High-speed Rail Projects in the United States," takes a critical look at high-speed rail efforts during that era, warning that some of the traffic estimates are overstated (5 (6) . The study examines the strategies that have been employed by agencies working to develop various high-speed systems in the country. An earlier Mineta publication by Andrew Nash focuses on the issues associated with operating high-speed trains on routes shared with other types of rail operations (7).
Another notable study in this category, prepared by Charles Quandel of the High Speed Ground Transportation Association in 2004, reviews the status of various HSR projects in the United States and estimates the costs of building 11 major "steel wheel/steel rail" systems to be $80.9 billion (in 2007 dollars) (8) . The study also estimates of the costs of building various Maglev routes. Among the notable Transportation Research Board papers in this category is Roth and Aggarwala's evaluation of track-sharing arrangements in the Northeast Corridor (9) .
Among the studies in the third group, lessons for international markets for HSR development, are Roger Vickerman's assessment of HSR in Europe (10), Guirao, Menéndez, and Rivas' review of track-sharing issues (11) , and studies of services in individual countries by Hsa and Chung (12), Hensher (13) , Rus and Inglada (14) , and Kobayashi and Okmura (15) . Another international study, by Fernand Martin, explores the relationship between HSR to economic growth by using a statistical model to define both diverted and induced travelers to HSR (16). Martin's study shows not only that HSR offers transportation benefits, but also that it can help to accelerate the growth and the development of regional economies.
METHODOLOGY
The analysis in this study is based on data of the 64 intercity corridors that have been identified by state or regional agencies for high-speed service. At least a portion of each route is envisioned to allow speeds of 110 mph or higher for passenger trains. Two corridors being planned for service at speeds less than 110 mph are included because they are extensions of routes identified for higher-speed service.
The corridors are divided into segments to account for operational or ownership differences along the route. For example, the Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac corridor (part of the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative) is divided into five segments: one owned by Amtrak (97 miles from Porter, Ind. to Kalamazoo, Mich.), another owned by Canadian National (23 miles from Detroit to Pontiac), and the remaining three held by Norfolk Southern.
Each corridor is assigned to one of four categories to describe its stage of development. Stage 2 corridors have a plan for high-speed service that is supported by an FEIS, making it eligible for federal funding.
Stage 3 corridors are supported by an FEIS and by direct state investment in passenger service or right-of-way improvement. For a corridor to be assigned to this category, state governments must (in addition to meeting the criteria for Stage 2) have made a direct investment in the corridor, either by making right-of-way investment or by supporting active conventional passenger service over the entire length of the route.
Stage 4 corridors have high-speed service that is currently available or scheduled to be available on at least a portion of the route by 2008. This category applies to routes in which passenger trains operate at 110 mph or higher, or will soon do so in the near future. This category includes three routes (Boston-New York, Harrisburg-Philadelphia, and New York-Washington, D.C.) now used for high-speed service, and one other (Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac) that is expected to have service at 110 mph within two years.
Corridors are also classified on the type of technology favored by state or local agencies. Each are assigned to one of five categories: diesel-powered systems, electric powered, Acela-type systems, bullet trains, and magnetic levitation (Maglev) systems (see Table 1 ).
TABLE 1: Technologies Identified for High-Speed Corridors

Diesel-powered:
Diesel locomotives or diesel multiple-unit (DMU) equipment, which are generally able to operate at a maximum speed of 110 mph or less. Includes Talgo and Turbo-train equipment.
Electric-powered:
Locomotives without tilt systems drawing power from external electrical systems, which are generally capable of speeds of 110 mph or less.
Acela-type systems:
Specially designed train-sets using electric power and equipped with active tilt systems capable of speeds of 135-150 mph. Acela technology is appropriate for routes shared with other types of passenger traffic. The New York-Washington, D.C., and Boston-New York corridors are in this category.
Bullet trains:
Electrically-propelled trains on dedicated right of way, without interference from slower traffic. These systems, similar to that of the European TGV or Japanese Shiskansen, generally allow for speeds exceeding 200 mph.
Maglev systems:
Magnetically levitated trains on fixed-guideway systems, operating at speeds in excess of 300 mph.
In cases where planners of HSR corridors have not selected a preferred technology, we generally shied away from the most advanced choices that were under consideration. For example, we assigned the "bullet train" category to numerous corridors in the California, Florida, and Texas systems even though Maglev technology remains an option in each case. (It should be noted, however, that more conventional diesel-powered systems are under being evaluated in Florida and Texas). The development of Maglev systems have been formally proposed on just three intercity routes: Baltimore-Washington, D.C., Atlanta-Chattanooga-Nashville, and Anaheim-Las Vegas.
Proposals for high-speed service that have either waned or have been formally dropped from consideration are omitted from the data set. Notable examples are Las Vegas-Reno, Nev.; Denver-Vail, Col.; and Seattle-Moses Lake, Wash. We also exclude corridors that are largely confined to a single metropolitan area, such as proposed Maglev systems in the Los Angeles, San Diego, and Pittsburgh regions. We further exclude several corridors that have received only a cursory evaluation by government agencies.
In some corridors, there is uncertainty about the preferred alignment (i.e., route choice). When a government agency has not yet settled upon an alignment, we list the route that appears to be most likely to emerge as the desired choice.
DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS
The following sections summarize notable aspects about the high-speed movement derived from an analysis of the various segments and corridors identified for HSR.
a. Various Initiatives Underway
The HSR movement in the United States consists of 21 separate initiatives, and involves 43 of the 48 states on the mainland (Figure 1 ). Eleven of these initiatives involve more than 500 route-miles ( Table 2 ).
The Midwest (Chicago Hub) and Southeast initiatives account for the greatest mileage, 3,570 and 1,913 miles, respectively, while the Baltimore-Washington, D.C., Maglev (40 miles) and the Minnesota (Twin Cities-Rochester) initiative (55 miles) involve the least mileage. The six largest initiatives each involve at least 1,000 miles of route or more and cumulatively account for 65 percent of the total mileage.
The number of systems under consideration has apparently risen sharply since 2000, with the Downeaster, Front Range, Gulf Coast, and Ohio & Lake Erie Hub systems among the most recent additions to the list. Several of the systems, however, have progressed relatively little since September 2001, after which the financial condition of many state governments deteriorated sharply.
TABLE 2: High-speed Rail Initiatives of the United States
System
Route-miles
b. Corridors Identified for Service
At present, 65 intercity corridors are targeted for high-speed service (Table 3) . These corridors cumulatively extend over 16,582 miles and encompass 15,552 unique miles of route. (A discrepancy in mileage occurs because several corridors overlap.) Forty-eight corridors are still in Stage I of development, and just eight have advanced to Stage 3 or higher. About 60 percent of the proposed mileage has received formal designation as a federal high-speed route.
c. System and Corridors with Overlapping Mileage
Several segments proposed for HSR development are part of more than one system. The Ohio & Lake Erie Hub system shares two segments east of Cleveland with the Midwest system as well as the segment between Buffalo and Niagara Falls with the Empire Corridor (Figure 1) . Furthermore, there are proposals for two separate HSR corridors between several major cities. Members of the New York General Assembly have proposed building both a Maglev line (to be developed by 2025) and a more conventional high-speed line between Buffalo and New York. There is also a proposal for Maglev service over the Baltimore-Washington, D.C., portion of the Northeast Corridor. 
d. Metropolitan Populations Served
The corridors identified for high-speed service reach the 49 most heavily populated metropolitan areas in the continental United States. Ninety three of the largest 100 metropolitan areas in the continental are along a proposed route. Additionally, 164 of the 250 largest metropolitan areas are along at least one corridor identified for service. These metropolitan areas have a population (based on the 2000 Census) of more than 192 million people.
Five metropolitan areas with metropolitan populations greater than 500,000 people (Charleston, S.C., El Paso, Tex., Knoxville, Tenn., Salt Lake City, Utah, and Wichita, Kansas) are not along proposed high-speed routes. Salt Lake City (960,000), which ranks 50 th in population, is the largest metropolitan area in this group. State officials have explored the feasibility of high-speed service to Charleston and Knoxville, and the governor of New Mexico has promoted the idea of service between Albuquerque and El Paso. It remains to be seen, however, whether a formal proposal for high-speed service to these metropolitan areas emerges anytime in the near future.
e. Interstate versus Intrastate Service
The high-speed rail movement is heavily oriented toward interstate service, with nearly two thirds (63%) of all proposed route-mileage composed of corridors that cross state lines. The number of interstate corridors outnumbers intrastate corridors by margin of two to one. As discussed below, planning efforts that involve interstate corridors tend to be more complex-and more reliant on federal support-than intrastate proposals.
All 43 states on the routes identified for high-speed service except Arizona have at least one interstate corridor under consideration. Arizona has not revived earlier proposals for highspeed service to southern California and is instead focusing on Phoenix-Tucson service. Consequently, Phoenix (3,200,000) is the most populous metropolitan area not on an interstate route targeted for high-speed service. 
g. Mileage by Class I Carrier
The various HSR systems involve using the tracks of 21 different freight railroads. The three most heavily affected carriers are Norfolk Southern (2,142 miles), CSX (2,016 miles), and Union Pacific (2,207 miles). BNSF, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific, conversely, are affected to a lesser degree (Table 4) . Proposed Maglev and bullet-train mileage built along railroad lines are excluded from these totals due to the need for total right-of-way separation over the vast majority of the route. Of the relevant mileage, 91 percent of the railroad right of way proposed for high-speed routes is operated by Class I railroads, with 9 percent operated by short-line or regional railroads.
h. Choices of Technology
The vast majority of the proposed system-11,513 miles, or about 74 percent of the total-involves some form of diesel technology-technologies not requiring the installation of electrification equipment, whether it is conventional diesel locomotive-drawn trains or diesel multiple-unit (DMU) equipment. Bullet-train technology accounts for 2,583 miles (17 percent), while Acela-type services (confined to the Northeast Corridor) represent 458 miles (3 percent) and Maglev systems constitute 852 miles (5 percent).
It should be emphasized that decisions about the preferred technology have not yet been made on several of these systems. Moreover, significant differences with respect to the preferred technology exist between interstate and intrastate proposals. As a general rule, interstate initiatives place much more emphasis on conventional technologies (e.g., diesel-powered or Acela-type services) than intrastate routes. Just 251 miles (3 percent) of the interstate mileage involves bullet-train or Maglev technology, yet 3,185 miles (57 percent) of the intrastate routes focus on these systems. The three largest intrastate systems, California, Empire Corridor, and Florida, all involve bullet-train and Maglev systems.
An apparent explanation for the more aggressive use of advanced technology in intrastate proposals is the perceived opportunity to tap into taxpayer-financed revenue steams. Planners of intrastate systems generally place greater hope in generating extensive funds from state governments than those who are working to build interstate corridors.
i. Incremental Improvements to Amtrak Service
Approximately 78% of the route-miles of the proposed HSR system involve incremental improvements to existing routes rather than building entirely new ones. Many such programs emphasize gradual increases in the speed of Amtrak service from the present-day maximum, which is typically 79 mph, to 110 mph. State governments provide financial support for Amtrak services on about 34 percent of the route-miles identified for high-speed diesel or electric service, but only 11 percent of route-miles identified for bullet-train, Acela, or Maglev technologies.
The passenger carrier also operates trains over many prospective HSR routes without state-government support. Altogether, about 8,576 miles (71 percent) of the existing railroad mileage identified for high-speed service is currently on the Amtrak system. Another 891 miles (7 percent) involves routes that Amtrak has discontinued. Only 21 percent of the existing railroad mileage targeted for high-speed service has been "freight-only" since 1971 (the beginning of Amtrak).
h. Creation of new Railroad Routes
Approximately 2,700 miles (17%) of the rights-of-way identified for high-speed service involve right of way currently being used for non-railroad purposes. A preponderance of this new mileage (about 80 percent of it) involves creating high-speed alignments along limited-access highways, most of which are part of the Interstate system.
Of the 64 corridors identified for service, 23 require gaining access to more than 20 miles of right of way never before used by a railroad. Florida's 1,327-mile system is particularly notable in this regard, with plans to build almost the entire system along Interstate Highway alignments. (As previously noted, recent announcements suggest that Florida officials are reconsidering this approach and may eventually pursue an incremental approach using existing tracks). Much of the California system will require gaining access to a more diverse mix of properties, including land adjacent to existing highways and railroads as well as land not presently used for transportation. Most of the Texas bullet-train system would be situated on a proposed multimodal transportation corridor in close proximity to Interstate 35.
i. Abandoned Corridors
Several corridors identified for high-speed service involve relaying rail over segments that have been abandoned by railroad companies. The preferred alignment in the Washington, D.C.-Raleigh corridor (which involves 75 miles of route not technically abandoned but no longer equipped with tracks) as well as New York-Scranton (30 miles of abandoned route), ChicagoGreen Bay (24 miles), and Chicago-Cincinnati (23 miles) are particularly noteworthy in this respect (Table 5 ; Column c). In the latter two corridors, the abandoned segments have been converted into recreation trails, creating the risk of a sharp response from the environmental community.
j. Public Ownership of Rail Corridors
About 12 percent of the railroad mileage targeted for HSR service (1,463 miles) belongs to public entities. Apart from Amtrak-owned routes, most of the publicly owned mileage belongs to regional transportation agencies in metropolitan Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Outside of the Northeast Corridor, the most notable routes in this category include Harrisburg-Philadelphia, which is owned by Amtrak, New York-Scranton, which has its ownership divided among several public agencies, and Charlotte-Raleigh, which is the property of the state-owned North Carolina Railroad, a public/private partnership with Norfolk Southern. (Table 5 , Column d) Amtrak owns nearly a third of the Chicago-Detroit/Pontiac route. (We are including Amtrak-owned lines in this category as that private corporation is publicly-funded, and was established by Congress for a public purpose.) In addition, The Casper-Albuquerque corridor is among the most recent additions to this list due to the state of New Mexico's acquisition of several hundred miles of former Santa Fe track in 2006.
Proponents of HSR in corridors that are publicly owned have notable advantages over their counterparts in other corridors. Not only does public ownership lessen or eliminate the need for negotiation with freight railroads, it can galvanize policymaker support for investments in corridor improvement and protect passenger services from conflicts resulting from growing freight traffic.
k. Track-Sharing Arrangements with Freight Railroads
Seventy percent (70%) of the existing rail mileage identified for high-speed service is presently used for high-density freight traffic, which is defined in this study as being at least 10 million gross tons per mile per year. (Many routes operated by short line and regional railroad have densities well under 5 million gross tons per year). A similar share of the mileage-about 74%-is single track. Both issues represent significant challenges to the development of HSR systems.
In addition to the Northeast Corridor, which allows of passenger operations without freight-train interference, several other routes with a high share of mileage free of high-density freight traffic, including New York-Scranton, Philadelphia-Harrisburg, and New HavenSpringfield, Mass., are located in the northeastern part of the country (Table 5 ; Column e).
Planners in numerous corridors are considering options for relocating freight traffic to alternative routes. Over parts of other corridors, such as the portion of Chicago-Cleveland route west of Toledo, planners have drafted plans to reroute passenger trains off freight-oriented mainlines onto lightly used routes maintained by regional and short line railroads, thus lessening congestion problems.
In some corridors, there is the potential for acquiring land adjacent to active freight mainlines for dedicated passenger tracks or for installing new signaling systems and passing tracks.
l. Mileage shared with Commuter Operators
Jointly using track with commuter railroads creates opportunities for cost-sharing but also adds to the complexity of corridor-building initiatives. An estimated 1,162 miles (10%) of the existing railroad mileage identified for HSR are used by these local operators. The Northeast Corridor has the highest proportion of its mileage shared with commuter operators, which use 68 percent and 97 percent of the Boston-New York and New York-Washington, D.C. route-miles, respectively.
In other several corridors throughout the country-Boston-Albany, Boston-Portland, Harrisburg-Philadelphia, New York-Buffalo, New York-Scranton, and San Francisco-Los Angeles (Coastal Route-more than one-fifth of the mileage would be shared with these commuter operators (Table 5 ; Part d). The Chicago-Madison, Wisconsin, portion of the Chicago-Twin Cities corridor also has extensive commuter-rail mileage, as do lengthy segments of routes not listed on the table, such as Eugene-Vancouver.
CONCLUSION
As this study has shown, the wide-ranging efforts to bring high-speed rail service to many parts of the United States are certainly not being hampered by a shortage of ambitious planning initiatives. The routes identified for service reach 43 states and all but seven of the 100 largest metropolitan areas on the U.S. mainland. Still more proposals are likely to emerge over the next several years.
The findings point to the need for greater federal leadership-beyond the annual appropriation for Amtrak-if states are to successfully acquire and improve rights-of-way for HSR. Outside of the Northeast Corridor, public ownership of railroad rights of way identified for high-speed service is quite limited, accounting for less than 10 percent of the existing railroad mileage. In addition, more than 70 percent of the proposals for high-speed routes that use existing railroad routes involve single-track lines currently used for mainline freight service.
Such findings illustrate the degree to which freight railroads will need to made active partners in corridor-development initiatives, a process that may require substantial financial incentives. In some cases, building dedicated tracks for high-speed trains may be necessary due to the capacity constraints caused by sheer freight volume.
The results also suggest that the choices of technology may be being affected by the differing political circumstances facing the planners of interstate and intrastate corridors. Planners of interstate corridors are placing emphasis on incremental and less-costly technologies than their counterparts working on intrastate corridors, partially due to the difficulty of coordinating plans that require significant revenues provided by state governments. The perceived opportunity to tap into taxpayer-financed revenue steams on intrastate route may also explain the more aggressive use of advanced technology on these systems.
In all probability, few of the proposed HSR corridors will actually see the introduction of high-speed service over the next decade. The majority will likely stall due to issues of cost, complexity, and a lack of public funding. One might reasonably ask whether the HSR movement would be more likely to achieve success if the energies of HSR advocates were not spread among so many different initiatives. The scope of these initiatives, however, is a strong indication that state and regional agencies are making concerted efforts to push high-speed rail to the forefront of the transportation agenda.
